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Abstract. Loiss is a byte-oriented stream cipher designed by Dengguo
Feng et al. Its design builds upon the design of the SNOW family of ci-
phers. The algorithm consists of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR)
and a non-linear ﬁnite state machine (FSM). Loiss utilizes a structure
called Byte-Oriented Mixer with Memory (BOMM) in its ﬁlter gener-
ator, which aims to improve resistance against algebraic attacks, linear
distinguishing attacks and fast correlation attacks. In this paper, by ex-
ploiting some diﬀerential properties of the BOMM structure during the
cipher initialization phase, we provide an attack of a practical complex-
ity on Loiss in the related-key model. As conﬁrmed by our experimental
results, our attack recovers 92 bits of the 128-bit key in less than one
hour on a PC with 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor. The possibility of
extending the attack to a resynchronization attack in a single-key model
is discussed. We also show that Loiss is not resistant to slide attacks.
1 Introduction
Several word-oriented LFSR-based stream ciphers have been recently proposed
and standardized. Examples include ZUC [1], proposed for use in the 4G mobile
networks and also SNOW 3G [3], which is deployed in the 3GPP networks.
The usual word-oriented LFSR-based design consists of a linear part, which
produces sequences with good statistical properties and a ﬁnite state machine
which provides non-linearity for the state transition function.
In 2011, the Loiss stream cipher [4] was proposed by a team from the State Key
Laboratory of Information Security in China. The cipher follows the above men-
tioned design approach: it includes a byte-orientedLFSR and anFSM.The novelty
in the design of Loiss is that its FSM includes a structure called a Byte Oriented-
Mixer withMemory (BOMM)which is a 16 byte array adopted from the idea of the
RC4 inner state. The BOMM structure is updated in a pseudorandommanner.
The Loiss key scheduling algorithm utilizes a usual approach to provide non-
linearity over all the inner state bits. During the initialization phase, the FSM
output is connected to the LFSR update function. This ensures that after the
initialization process, the LFSR content depends non-linearly on the key and
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the IV. Such an approach has been previously used in several LFSR-based word-
oriented constructions such as the SNOW family of ciphers [3]. In Loiss, however,
the FSM contains the BOMM element which is updated slowly in a pseudo-
random manner. The feedback to the LFSR, used in the initialization phase,
passes through this BOMM which turns out to be exploitable in a diﬀerential-
style attack since the BOMM does not properly diﬀuse diﬀerences.
In this paper, we provide a related-key attack of a practical complexity against
the Loiss stream cipher by exploiting this weakness in its key scheduling algo-
rithm (see also [7] for a work that was done independently of our results). The
attack requires two related keys diﬀering in one byte, a computational work of
around 226 Loiss initializations, 225.8 chosen-IVs for both of the related keys,
oﬄine precomputation of around 226 Loiss initializations and a storage space of
232 words. This shows that the additional design complication, i.e., the addition
of the BOMM mechanism, weakens the cipher instead of strengthening it. We
also discuss the possibility of extending such a related-key attack into a resyn-
chronization single-key attack. Finally, we show that Loiss does not properly
resist to slide attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy review
relevant speciﬁcations of the Loiss stream cipher. Our related-key attack is de-
tailed in section 3 where we also discuss the possibility of extending the attack
to the single-key scenario. In section 4, we show that Loiss is not resistant to
slide attacks. Finally, our conclusion is given in section 5.
2 Speciﬁcations of Loiss
Figure 1 shows a schematic description of the Loiss stream cipher. In here, we
brieﬂy review relevant components of the cipher. Let F28 denote the quotient
ﬁeld F2[x]/(π(x)), where the corresponding primitive polynomial π(x) = x
8 +
x7 + x5 + x3 + 1. If α is a root of the polynomial π(x) in F28 , then the LFSR of
Loiss is deﬁned over F28 using the characteristic polynomial
f(x) = x32 + x29 + αx24 + α−1x17 + x15 + x11 + αx5 + x2 + α−1.
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Fig. 1. Loiss stream cipher
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The usual bijection between the elements of F28 and 8-bit binary values is used.
The LFSR consists of 32 byte registers denoted by si, 0 ≤ i ≤ 31. Restating
the above equation, if st0, . . . , s
t
31 denote the LFSR registers after t LFSR clocks,
then the LFSR update function is deﬁned by
st+131 = s
t
29 ⊕ αst24 ⊕ α−1st17 ⊕ st15 ⊕ st11 ⊕ αst5 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α−1st0 (1)
and st+1i = s
t
i+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 30.
The FSM consists of the function F and the BOMM. The function F com-
presses 32-bit words into 8-bit values. It utilizes a 32-bit memory unit R and
takes LFSR registers s31, s26, s20 and s7 as input. In particular, in each step,
the output of F is taken to be the 8 leftmost bits of the register R, after which
the R value is updated by
X = st31|st26|st20|st7
Rt+1 = θ(γ(X ⊕Rt))
where γ is the S-box layer which uses 8× 8 S-box S1 and is deﬁned by
γ(x1|x2|x3|x4) = S1(x1)|S1(x2)|S1(x3)|S1(x4)
and θ is a linear transformation layer deﬁned by
θ(x) = x⊕ (x <<< 2)⊕ (x <<< 10)⊕ (x <<< 18)⊕ (x <<< 24)
Since the attack technique provided in this paper does not depend on the par-
ticular choice of the used S-boxes, we refer the reader to [4] for the speciﬁcations
of S1 and S2.
As for the BOMM structure, it utilizes 16 memory units, i.e., bytes y0, . . . , y15.
The BOMM function maps 8-bit values to 8-bit values. Let w and v denote the
input and output of the BOMM function. Denote the nibbles of its input w as
h = w >> 4 and l = w mod 16. Then, the BOMM function returns v = yth ⊕ w,
after which the update of its memory units takes place as follows:
yt+1l = y
t
l ⊕ S2(w)
If h = l, then
yt+1h = y
t
h ⊕ S2(yt+1l )
else
yt+1h = y
t+1
l ⊕ S2(yt+1l )
yt+1i = y
t
i , for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15 and i /∈ {h, l}
where S2 is an 8 × 8 S-box. In the FSM update step, the input to the BOMM
function, i.e., the w value, is taken to be leftmost byte of the output of the F
function.
The initialization procedure of Loiss proceeds as follows. The register R is set
to zero, i.e., R0 = 0. If the key K and the initialization vector IV are represented
byte-wise as
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K = K15|K14| · · · |K0
IV = IV15|IV14| · · · |IV0,
(2)
then the starting inner state (s031, . . . , s
0
0, R
0, y015, . . . , y
0
0) is loaded with the K
and IV as follows:
s0i = Ki, s
0
i+16 = Ki ⊕ IVi, y0i = IVi (3)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. Then, Loiss runs for 64 steps and the output of the BOMM
takes part in the LFSR update step. In other words, instead of (1), the following
LFSR update function is used:
st+131 = s
t
29 ⊕ αst24 ⊕ α−1st17 ⊕ st15 ⊕ st11 ⊕ αst5 ⊕ st2 ⊕ α−1st0 ⊕ vt (4)
Then, the keystream generation stage starts. Loiss generator produces one byte
of keystream per step:
zt = st0 ⊕ vt.
In general, except for the new BOMM component, the whole Loiss design is very
similar to the design of the SNOW 3G cipher. It is also interesting to note that
the same θ linear layer has been used in the SMS4 block cipher [2] and also in
ZUC [1].
3 Proposed Attack
In this section, a diﬀerential-style attack against the Loiss key scheduling algo-
rithm is presented. The attack requires two related keys that diﬀer in one byte.
It also requires the ability to resynchronize the cipher under the two keys with
chosen IV values.
The attack starts by having the pair of inner states right after the key load-
ing step diﬀer only in one LFSR byte and one BOMM byte. Then, the idea is to
have the LFSR diﬀerence fully cancelled. We use the fact that the BOMM output
participates in the LFSR update step during the initialization and the BOMM
diﬀerence helps us to cancel out the LFSR diﬀerence through the feedback. Once
the diﬀerence in the LFSR is fully cancelled, only the BOMM component is active
and moreover, with a single byte diﬀerence. Then, since the BOMM does not have
proper diﬀusion properties, the single-byte diﬀerence stays localized in the BOMM
until the end of the initialization, which can be detected from the keystream.
The probability of the event that a given BOMM byte is not used during the
initialization is (1516 )
128 ≈ 2−12, since a BOMM element is consulted 128 times
during the 64 initialization steps. If the active byte has not been used until
the end of the initialization, the two instances of the cipher generate several
equal keystream bytes with high probability. Namely, the diﬀerence at the point
where the keystream is to be produced will be of low-weight and localized in the
BOMM. Therefore, spotting large number of zero bytes in the starting keystream
byte diﬀerence indicates that the LFSR diﬀerence cancellations described above
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took place. These cancellations happen only when certain equations in the start-
ing LFSR bytes are satisﬁed and consequently, since the starting LFSR bits are
related to the key bits, information about the key bits leaks.
Let K and K ′ diﬀer only in the byte K3. The steps of the attack can be
summarized as follows:
- Construct a list of (IV, IV ′) pairs for which the LFSR state diﬀerence can-
cellation happens. The cancellation event is described in section 3.1, the
distinguisher used to detect this event is given in section 3.2 and a proce-
dure for collecting the (IV, IV ′) pairs is provided in section 3.3.
- Use this collection of IVs as input to the ﬁltering procedure to ﬁlter the
wrong key candidates, as described in section 3.4.
The attack recovers 92 bits of the key and the remaining 128− 92 = 36 bits can
be obtained by brute force. In another variant of the attack, 112 bits of the key
are recovered and the rest are found by brute-force.
3.1 Cancelling the LFSR Diﬀerence
In this section, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the starting inner state
diﬀerence to be fully cancelled in the LFSR after 4 steps is provided. The condi-
tion is speciﬁed in terms of the leftmost byte of the R register in the ﬁrst 4 steps.
Then, the conditions on the R register as provided by Observation 1 below leak
information on the early LFSR bytes and thus about the secret key.
The key-loading mechanism (3) allows having a chosen diﬀerence only at bytes
s3 and y3 at time t = 0. Namely, it suﬃces to have
K3 ⊕K ′3 = IV3 ⊕ IV ′3 = δ (5)
and the rest of the K,K ′ and also IV, IV ′ bytes to have a zero-diﬀerence. More-
over, the key-loading mechanism trivially allows choosing the starting values of
the y3 register. This is done by choosing the IV3 byte, since the IV is simply
copied into the BOMM. This shows that the assumptions required by Obser-
vation 1 (i.e., the particular diﬀerence value 0x02 in s3 and y3 and also the
y3 = 0x9d constant) can be satisﬁed. Recall that w
t denotes the leftmost byte
of the R register at time t ≥ 0.
Observation 1. Let a pair of Loiss inner states have only s3 and y3 bytes active,
both with diﬀerence 0x02. Also, let y3 = 0x9d. Then, after 4 steps, the LFSR
does not contain any active byte if and only if
(w0, w1, w2, w3) = (0x00, 0x33, 0xK?, 0x3?) (6)
where K is any hexadecimal digit diﬀerent from 0x3 and the symbol ‘?” denotes
any hexadecimal digit.
The proof of the observation above is given in Appendix B. Here, a descriptive
overview of the cancellation speciﬁed by Observation 1 is provided. In Figure 2,
124 A. Biryukov, A. Kircanski, and A.M. Youssef
the BOMM and the LFSR bytes s3, s2, s1, s0 are shown during the ﬁrst four steps.
In the second and the fourth states in the ﬁgure, the cancellation of the LFSR
diﬀerence by the feedback byte to the LFSR update is denoted. In the ﬁrst step,
the diﬀerence does not enter neither the LFSR update function nor the feedback
value (since w0 = 0x00). In the second step, it is required that w1 = 0x33 for the
diﬀerence to be cancelled and also to be updated to the next necessary BOMM
diﬀerence value, 2α−1. In the third step, the diﬀerence is neither passed to the
LFSR nor changed in the BOMM. Finally, in the fourth step, the diﬀerence in the
LFSR byte s0 is cancelled and the LFSR becomes fully inactive.
It should be noted that Observation 1 holds for other diﬀerence values apart
from δ = 0x02. The set Δ of such diﬀerences is given in Appendix A. In particu-
lar, Observation 1 is true for any δ ∈ F 82 such that the input diﬀerences α−1 × δ
and δ cannot be mapped to the output diﬀerences α−1 × δ by the S2 S-box (see
the (⇒) part of the proof in Appendix B). For each diﬀerence from the set Δ,
the initial constant for y30 is calculated from (14).
The overall probability that there will be only one BOMM byte, y3, active
after all of the 64 steps of the key scheduling procedure is estimated next. For
this event to happen, it suﬃces to have (6) satisﬁed in addition to ensuring
that the y3 diﬀerence does not propagate to other bytes during the initialization
procedure. The event (6) happens with probability pw = 2
−8× 1516×2−4 ≈ 2−12.1.
The event by which the y3 diﬀerence does not propagate to any other byte is
equivalent to the event of wt mod 16 = 0x3 and wt >> 4 = 0x3 for 4 ≤ t ≤ 63,
and w2 mod 16 = 3. The latter condition is included since Observation 1 does
not rule out the possibility of the spreading of the y3 diﬀerence to another byte
during step 3. Thus, the probability that y3 does not spread to any other byte
is ps = (
15
16 )
2×60+1 ≈ 2−11.3. Thus, a randomly chosen key-IV pair satisfying (5)
such that the assumptions of Observation 1 are satisﬁed produces a pair of inner
states with only one active byte with probability
p = ps × pw = 2−12.1 × 2−11.3 = 2−23.4 (7)
under the usual independence assumption.
 
 
 
     

     
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
     

     
     
     
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
 
 
 
     
     
     
     




    
	
  



  

  




















ﬀ





ﬀ 




ﬀ





ﬀ
ﬁﬂﬃ 
ﬁﬂﬃ 
ﬁﬂﬃ 
ﬁﬂﬃ 

Fig. 2. Illustration of the diﬀerences in the BOMM structure at times t = 0, 1, 2, 3
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3.2 Distinguishing Loiss Pairs
In the previous subsection, we showed that it is possible to have a pair of Loiss
inner states with only one active byte (located in the BOMM) after the ini-
tialization. Here, a distinguisher for the keystreams generated by a pair of such
states is provided. The goal is to minimize the probability of false positives and
false negatives.
Let the time at which the two instances of the cipher diﬀer by only one BOMM
byte be t = 0. Since at this time most of the words are inactive, it is natural to
attempt distinguishing Loiss key stream pairs from random keystream pairs by
simply counting the number of equal bytes in the two outputs. Such a distin-
guisher depends on parameters n and m, where n is the number of keystream
generation steps that will be considered and m is the number of equal corre-
sponding words in steps 0, . . . , n− 1. The distinguisher can be formulated as:
- Count the number of indices 0 ≤ i < n such that zi = z′i
- If this count is ≥ m return Loiss keystreams, otherwise return Random.
Good values for (n,m) can be chosen by consulting Table 1 Appendix C. In this
table, the probability of false positives and false negatives for some representative
(n,m) points has been tabulated. Details on how the values in the table have
been calculated are provided below.
The false positive probability signiﬁes the probability that in two random
sequences of n bytes, more than m corresponding bytes will be equal. On the
other hand, the false negative probability signiﬁes the probability that two Loiss
instances with only one active byte located in the BOMM, will produce strictly
less than m equal bytes. For the purpose of the attack above, it is necessary to
keep the probability of false positives low, since a false positive would lead to
generating equations that have incorrect key values as solutions.
As for the false positive probability, it has been calculated by using the formula
describing the probability that in n randomly generated bytes, at leastm of them
are equal to zero. Namely, if l denotes the number of zeros in the sample, then
P [false positive] = P [l ≥ m] = ∑l=m,...,n
(
n
l
) (
1
256
)l ( 255
256
)n−l
.
The false negative probability has been calculated experimentally by ran-
domly generating a pair of equal Loiss inner states and then inducing a random
diﬀerence at a random BOMM byte. After running the cipher for n steps, the
number of equal bytes is counted. If such number is strictly smaller than m, a
counter is incremented. After repeating the previous procedure for 228 times and
dividing the resulting counter by 228, an approximation of the probability of a
false negatives is obtained.
For the purpose of the distinguisher used in the next subsection, taking
(n,m) = (32, 10) makes the probability of the attack failure marginally small,
i.e., equal to around 225.8 × 2−54.2, since the distinguisher is applied for around
225.8 times and a false positive answer would lead to wrong conclusions about
the value of key bytes.
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3.3 Finding the Correct IVs
According to the cancellation probability (7), for around one in 223.4 randomly
chosen IVs, if the key-IV pair satisﬁes (5), the inner state right after the ini-
tialization will have only the y3 BOMM byte active. Given the choices for the
distinguisher given in Table 1, such event can be reliably detected. Hereafter,
such IVs will be called correct IVs. In this section, it is shown that the correct
IVs can be found with probability better than 2−23.4, which helps us reduce the
ﬁnal number of chosen-IVs required for the attack.
In particular, once one correct IV is obtained, more such correct IVs can be
found with better probability. Namely, changing certain IV bytes in a correct
IV does not inﬂuence all w1, w2 and w3 bytes. For instance, perturbing byte
IV11 in a correct IV does not change w
1 = 0x33 value and the the probability
(7) that the new IV will also be a correct one increases by a factor of 28. More
precisely, let T1 denote a collection of IV bytes such that any change in bytes
from T1 leaves R
1 unchanged, but changes Rt, t ≥ 2. It is easy to verify that
T1 = {IV1, IV5, IV8, IV11, IV13}.
Thus, after ﬁnding one correct IV, varying only the bytes from T1 can serve
to ﬁnd more correct IVs with better probability. Such a set of IVs would result
in the IVs for which the R1 word is constant. However, the attack step provided
in subsection 3.4, which takes the correct IV set as its input, requires that the
IVs produce about 5 diﬀerent R1 values. Similarly, there have to be around
360 diﬀerent R2 values. These two numbers of required diﬀerent R1 and R2
values are necessary to minimize the number of key byte candidates that will
be recovered, as will be explained in the next subsection. Therefore, the search
procedure that produces the input to the procedure in the next subsection can
proceed as follows:
- Let sets L0 = L1 = L2 = L3 = L4 = ∅.
- Generate 5 correct IVs randomly and place them in sets Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ 4,
respectively. In more detail, for each randomly generated IV , compute IV ′
according to (5) and apply the distinguisher from subsection 3.2. If the dis-
tinguisher returns a positive answer, a correct IV has been found.
- For 0 ≤ i ≤ 4
- Using the IV from each Li, generate more corrects IVs such that the Li
sets contain 72 IVs each. In particular, the new correct IVs are generated
by randomizing the starting IV bytes speciﬁed by T1 and applying the
distinguisher.
The output of the above procedure are sets Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ 3, each containing
72 IVs for which the R1 is constant. This procedure takes around 5 × 223.4 +
5 × 72 × 223.4−8 ≈ 226 chosen-IV queries on both Loiss instances. If instead
of applying the previous procedure, all of the 5 × 72 = 360 correct IVs were
generated randomly, the number of chosen IV queries would be 360 × 223.4 ≈
231.9.
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3.4 Filtering the Key Bytes
In each Loiss step, the function F updates the register R by a transformation
similar to one round of a block cipher, where the R value plays the role of the
plaintext and the four LFSR registers play the role of the round key. The goal
hereafter is to recover the LFSR registers fed to F in the ﬁrst three initialization
steps, i.e., s7+i, s20+i, s26+i, s31+i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2. In particular, since the LFSR
bytes in question can be represented as a sum of the key and the IV, the goal is
to recover the key part in these bytes. First, the application of the F function
in the ﬁrst three steps is represented in the form of
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Fig. 3. The R register in times 0 ≤ t ≤ 3
Ri+1 = F (Ri, ki3 ⊕ ivi3|ki2 ⊕ ivi2|ki1 ⊕ ivi1|ki0) (8)
for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, where ki3, ki2, ki1 and ki0 depend only on the original key bytes and
ivi3, iv
i
2 and iv
i
1 depend only on the IV bytes. More precisely, in the ﬁrst step
k03 = K15, k
0
2 = K10, k
0
1 = K4, k
0
0 = K7
iv03 = IV15, iv
0
2 = IV10, iv
0
1 = IV4
(9)
In the second step, we have
k13 = K13 ⊕ αK8 ⊕ α−1K1 ⊕K15 ⊕K11 ⊕ αK5 ⊕K2 ⊕ α−1K0
k12 = K11, k
1
1 = K5, k
1
0 = K8
iv13 = IV13 ⊕ αIV8 ⊕ α−1IV1 ⊕ IV15 ⊕ IV11 ⊕ αIV5 ⊕ (10)
IV2 ⊕ α−1IV0 ⊕ f1
iv12 = IV11, iv
1
1 = IV5
and in the third step
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k23 = K14 ⊕ αK9 ⊕ α−1K2 ⊕K0 ⊕K12 ⊕ αK6 ⊕K3 ⊕ α−1K1
k22 = K12, k
2
1 = K6, k
2
0 = K9
iv23 = IV14 ⊕ αIV9 ⊕ α−1IV2 ⊕ IV0 ⊕ IV12 ⊕ αIV6 ⊕ IV3 ⊕ (11)
α−1IV1 ⊕ f2
iv22 = IV12, iv
2
1 = IV6
where f1, f2 represent the feedback bytes. If the IV bytes in the right-hand side
of (9), (10) and (11) are taken from a correct IV, then (6) will hold. In that case,
also, the feedback bytes will be f1 = IV0 and f
2 = IV3 ⊕ 0x33. The ﬁrst three
steps of the F function when a correct IV is used are represented schematically
in Figure 3.
Then, the ﬁltering procedure for recovering kij , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 amounts
to substituting the F function key guesses into (8) along with the iv bytes derived
from a correct IV and then verifying whether (6) holds. In particular, the ﬁltering
procedure is done round by round. As for the ﬁrst F round, (6) amounts to
R1 >> 24 = 0x33 and thus a candidate for k0 = k03 |k02 |k01 |k00 passes the criterion
with probability 2−8, which implies that 5 correct IVs are suﬃcient to uniquely
determine k0 with a good probability. We have veriﬁed experimentally that there
is enough diﬀusion in one F -round to ﬁnd the key uniquely with just 5 correct
IVs.
As for the second step of the initialization phase, where (8) is executed for
i = 1, ﬁrst it should be noted that R1 is known for each IV since k03 |k02 |k01 |k00 is
known. According to (6), the second F round criterion amounts to R2 >> 28 = 3.
Thus, a guess for k1 = k13 |k12 |k11 |k10 passes the criterion with probability 1516 .
Assuming that all the wrong key bits can be eliminated, around 332 correct IV
values will be required, since 232 × (1516 )332 ≈ 1. In the previous section, 360
correct IVs has been generated, which ensures the unique recovery of k1 with
good probability. Throughout all our experiments, the number of candidates
for k1 that pass the test was consistently equal to 16. Without going into why
16 candidates always pass the test, it is noted that these candidates can be
eliminated during the third F round ﬁltering. The third F round criterion is
R3 >> 28 = 3 and one can expect that the candidate for k2 = k23 |k22 |k21 |k20 passes
with probability 2−4, meaning that around 8 correct IV values will be required.
The ﬁltering is done for each of the 16 candidates for k1. Again, experimentally,
it was found that 16 candidates for k2 always pass the test and therefore there
will be 16 candidates at the end of the ﬁltering procedure.
It remains to state how the correct IVs are drawn from Li, 0 ≤ i ≤ 4 to derive
the ivi values speciﬁed by (9), (10) and (11). For the ﬁrst F round ﬁltering,
the 5 IVs are chosen from L0, L1, L2, L3 and L4, respectively, which ensures
that diﬀerent 5 iv0 values will be derived and that the ﬁltering procedure will
properly work. The second and third round choice of the IVs is arbitrary.
Attack Complexity: After the ﬁltering procedure described above, there will
remain 16 candidates for kij , 0 ≤ i ≤ 2, 0 ≤ j ≤ 3 (96 bits). Each of the 16
candidates yields a linear system in the cipher key bytes determined by (9), (10)
and (11). Since the linear equations in the system are independent, it follows
Cryptanalysis of the Loiss Stream Cipher 129
that a 96 − 4 = 92-bit constraint on the key K is speciﬁed. At this point, the
attacker can either brute-force the remaining 128− 92 = 36 key bits or continue
with the ﬁltering process described above to deduce more key bits. In case of
brute-forcing the 36 bits, the total complexity of the attack is dominated by
around 236 Loiss initialization procedures.
In the case where the ﬁltering process is continued, the criterion R4 >> 28 = 3
can be used to ﬁlter out more key bits. Namely, expanding the corresponding
iv3 and k3 values in a way analogous to (9)-(11), while taking into account the
feedback byte in the LFSR update, reveals that altogether 20 more key bits can
be recovered. In that case, the total complexity is dominated by the complexity
of the above ﬁltering procedures. The most expensive step is the ﬁltering based
on the second F round. We recall that in this ﬁltering step, for each of the 360
correct IVs, each 32-bit key value is tested and eliminated if R2 >> 28 = 3 does
not hold. Instead of applying the F function 232 × 360 ≈ 240.5 times, one can
go through all key candidates for a particular IV, eliminate around 1516 of them
and then, for the next IV, only go through the remaining candidates. In such a
case, the number of applications of F is
∑360
i=0(
15
16 )
i232 ≈ 236. To have further
optimization, a table containing 232 entries and representing F function can be
prepared in advance. To measure the computational complexity of the attack
in terms of Loiss initializations, a conservative estimate that one table lookup
costs around 2−4 of a reasonable implementation of one Loiss initialization step
could be accepted. Then, since there are 64 = 26 steps in the initialization, the
ﬁnal complexity amounts to around 226 Loiss initializations, 225.8 chosen-IVs for
both keys, storage space of 232 32-bit words and oﬄine precomputation of 232
applications of F , which is less than 226 Loiss initializations, since each Loiss
initialization includes 26 F computations.
Our attack was implemented and tested on a PC with 3 GHz Intel Pentium 4
processor with one core. Our implementation takes less than one hour to recover
92 bits of the key information and the attack procedure was successful on all the
tested 32 randomly generated keys.
3.5 Towards a Resynchronization Attack
Here, some preliminary observations on the possibility of adapting the above
attack to the single-key model are provided. In the single-key resynchronization
attack, only the IV can have active bytes, which means that only the left-hand
half of the LFSR, i.e., registers s16, . . . , s31 as well as the BOMM will contain
active bytes. As in the related-key attack above, the strategy is to have the
diﬀerence cancelled out in the LFSR and localized only in the BOMM early
during the initialization. One of the obstacles is that the R register will neces-
sarily be activated when the diﬀerence reaches byte s7, since the left-hand half
of the LFSR contains active bytes. We note that this obstacle can be bypassed
by cancelling the introduced R diﬀerence by having more than one LFSR byte
active. Let LFSR bytes s9, s8 and s7 be active with diﬀerences δ2, δ1, δ0 at
some time t during the initialization procedure. Also, assume that the word R
and the BOMM bytes to be used in the next three steps are inactive. Below, we
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determine how many of the (δ2, δ1, δ0) values can leave R inactive after 3 steps
(after having passed through s7) and also the probability of occurrence of such
an event. For this purpose, note that the R cancellation event occurs if
γ(F (xt)⊕ ut+1)⊕ γ(F (xt ⊕ δ0)⊕ ut+1 ⊕ δ1) = θ−1δ2 (12)
where xt = Rt ⊕ ut and ut denotes the 32-bit words fed to the F function
from the LFSR in t-th step. By using a precomputed table for the S-box S1
that, for each input and output diﬀerence, contains the information whether it
is possible to achieve the input-output diﬀerence pair or not, we exhaustively
checked for which values of (δ2, δ1, δ0) equation (12) has solutions in x
t and
ut+1. The result of the ﬁnding is that only 2−12.861 of (δ2, δ1, δ0) values cannot
yield an R diﬀerence cancellation event. For the remaining (δ2, δ1, δ0), for which
(12) does have a solution, the probability of the R diﬀerence cancellation is
2−4 × 2−28 = 2−32.
The analysis above indicates that attackers can choose almost any (δ2, δ1, δ0)
starting diﬀerence at three consecutive LFSR bytes and then bypass an R ac-
tivation with a probability of 2−32. A possible favorable position to introduce
such (δ2, δ1, δ0) diﬀerence can be in registers s18, s17, s16, since the R register will
only be activated through byte s7. This can be done by activating IV2, IV1, IV0
bytes. The 3-byte diﬀerence that arises in the BOMM then needs to be used for
cancellations whenever some of the active LFSR bytes pass through the taps.
Due to the relatively high number of cancellations that need to happen as the
diﬀerence moves towards the right, we have not been able to bring the cancella-
tion probability suﬃciently high enough to have a practical attack. Controlling
the diﬀerence propagation as done in [6] may be useful for that purpose. It is
left for future research to verify whether a practical resynchronization single-key
attack can be mounted against Loiss.
4 Sliding Properties of Loiss
In [5], a slide attack on SNOW 3G and SNOW 2.0 was provided. This attack is
a related-key attack and involves a key-IV pair (K, IV ) and (K ′, IV ′). The idea
is to have the inner state of the (K, IV ) instance after n ≥ 1 steps be a starting
inner state. Then, the corresponding (K ′, IV ′) initializes to this starting state
and the equality of the inner states is preserved until the end of the procedure.
The similarity between the two keystreams is detected and this provides a ba-
sis for the key-recovery attack. Since LFSR-based word-oriented stream ciphers
usually do not use counters which are the usual countermeasure against this kind
of slide attacks, one way to protect against sliding is to have the initial inner
state populated by the key, IV and constants so that it disallows the next several
states to be starting states. For example, in ZUC [1], constants are loaded in a
way that makes it diﬃcult to mount a slide attack.
In the following, we point out that Loiss, similar to SNOW 2.0 and SNOW
3G, does not properly defend against sliding. If C0 = S
−1
1 (0) and C1 = S2(0), a
slide by one step can be achieved as follows.
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Observation 2. Let K = (K15, . . . ,K0) and IV = (A, . . . , A,B), where
A = (α⊕α−1⊕1)−1(K0⊕α−1K0⊕α−1K1⊕K2⊕αK5⊕αK8⊕K11⊕K13⊕C0)
and B is determined by B ⊕ C1 ⊕ S2(B ⊕ C1) = A. Also, assume that K7 = C0
and K4 = K10 = K15 = C0 ⊕ A. Then, for K ′ = (K0 ⊕ B,K15, . . . ,K1) and
IV ′ = (A, . . . , A), we have
z′0 = z1 (13)
The proof of the observation is given in Appendix B.
Due to the requirement on bytes K7, K4, K10 and K15 from the formulation
of the observation above, a Loiss key K has a related key pair speciﬁed by the
observation above with probability 2−32. For the related keysK andK ′ satisfying
the conditions above, the attack can be performed by going through all A ∈ F 82
and verifying whether the relation (13) is satisﬁed for IV = (A, . . . , A,B), and
IV ′ = (A, . . . , A). If yes, then such an A byte is a candidate for the right-hand
side of the equation above specifying A, which depends only on K bytes. Each
false candidate out of 28 candidates for A will pass the test (13) with probability
2−8. That way, around one byte of the key information leaks. Slides by more
than one step may also be possible.
5 Conclusion
We presented a practical-complexity related-key attack on the Loiss stream ci-
pher. The fact that a slowly changing array (the BOMM) has been added as
a part of the FSM in Loiss allowed the diﬀerence to be contained (i.e., do not
propagate) during a large number of inner state update steps with a relatively
high probability. The attack was implemented and our implementation takes less
than one hour on a PC with 3GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor to recover 92 bits
of the 128-bit key. The possibility of extending the attack to a resynchronization
attack in a single-key model was discussed. We also showed that a slide attack
is possible for the Loiss stream cipher.
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A The Set of Possible Diﬀerences
Observation 1 is true for the following values (shown in hexadecimal):
Δ = {2, 5, 7, 9, d, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 1a, 1c, 1d, 1f, 20, 21, 25, 27, 2a, 2b, 2c, 2e, 2f, 31,
32, 37, 38, 39, 3d, 3e, 45, 48, 4a, 4b, 4d, 4f, 50, 54, 56, 57, 5b, 5c, 5d, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 6a,
6b, 6c, 6f, 70, 72, 74, 75, 77, 79, 7a, 7b, 7d, 7f, 80, 81, 82, 87, 89, 8b, 8d, 8e, 92, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99,
9a, 9c, 9d, 9e, a0, a1, a9, aa, ac, ae, af, b0, b2, b5, b8, ba, bc, bd, bf, c0, c1, c3, c4, c5, c7, ca, cd,
d1, d2, d3, d4, d6, d7, d8, da, dc, de, df, e1, e2, e8, eb, ed, f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, f7, f9, fb, fc, ff}
B Proof of Observations 1 and 2
In this appendix, we provide proofs for the two observations listed in the paper.
Proof of Observation 1:
From the cipher speciﬁcation, w0 = 0x00 is true regardless of the condition
on the left-hand side. The two directions of the proof are provided as follows.
(⇐): The change of the diﬀerence in the BOMM is described in Figure 2. In
the ﬁrst step, since w0 = 0x00, both the value and the diﬀerence of y03 remain
unchanged and the LFSR diﬀerence is moved from s3 to s2. Since w
1 = 0x33
and both s2 and y
1
3 are active with the same diﬀerence, they cancel out and the
corresponding LFSR byte becomes inactive. As for the LFSR diﬀerence, it is just
moved to s1. Another eﬀect of the second step is the change of the diﬀerence
in y3 byte from 0x02 to α
−1 × 2. Namely, expanding the diﬀerence in the y3
byte and substituting the initial choice of y03 = 0x9d and also the choice of the
starting diﬀerence δ = 0x02 gives
y23 ⊕ y
′2
3 = δ ⊕ S2(y03 ⊕ S2(0x33))⊕ S2(y03 ⊕ δ ⊕ S2(0x33)) = α−1 × 0x02 (14)
The third step moves the s1 active byte to s0, since w
2 >> 4 = 3 and leaves
the y3 diﬀerence unchanged. Finally, since w
3 >> 4 = 0x3, the diﬀerence in y3
cancels out the diﬀerence in the LFSR update function (4) in the fourth step
and this direction of the proof follows.
(⇒): Clearly, w1 >> 4 = 0x3 since otherwise s131 would be active and the LFSR
after 4 steps would necessarily have at least one active byte. Moreover, K =
w2 >> 4 = 0x3 holds since y23 is necessarily active and otherwise there would be
a diﬀerence introduced to the LFSR on byte s231.
To show that w1 mod 4 = 0x3, assume the contrary. In that case, the full
LFSR cancellation in the fourth step cannot happen. Namely, in the second
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step, the diﬀerence in register y13 remains unchanged, i.e., it remains equal to
0x02. Therefore, during the third step, the existing one byte diﬀerence in the
BOMM has to evolve to α−1 × 2 in order for the LFSR cancellation to happen
in the fourth step. However, according to the S2 speciﬁcation, the input S2
diﬀerence 0x02 cannot be transformed to the output diﬀerence α−1×2 and thus
w1 mod 4 = 0x3.
Now, according to the (⇐) direction of the proof, (14) holds. To show that
w3 >> 4 = 0x3, suppose the contrary. Since the LFSR byte s0 is active at the
fourth step (with the diﬀerence 0x2), for this diﬀerence to be cancelled out, the
BOMM output byte at step four has to be active with the same diﬀerence. Thus,
the diﬀerence in y23 which is equal to α
−1× 0x02 has to remain α−1× 0x02 after
passing through the S2 S-box. This diﬀerence will necessarily be induced on
some other BOMM byte since K = 3. However, such a possibility is ruled out
by the S2 speciﬁcation: the S2 S-box cannot map the input diﬀerence α
−1 × 2
to α−1 × 2 output diﬀerence. It should be noted that this was possible in (14),
since the same byte was updated twice in step 1. Therefore, w3 >> 4 = 0x3 has
to hold. 
Proof of Observation 2
We will show that
IS1 = (s131, . . . , s
1
0, R
1, y116, . . . , y
1
0)
= (s
′0
31, . . . , s
′0
0 , R
′0, y
′0
16, . . . , y
′0
0 ) = IS
′0 (15)
As for the BOMM bytes yi, 15 ≤ i ≤ 0, in the (K, IV ) instance of the cipher, only
y0 will be updated since R
0 = 0. In other words, y1i = A for 15 ≤ i ≤ 1. Moreover,
from the speciﬁcation of B, it follows that y10 = A. Since IV
′ = (A, . . . , A),
y
′0
i = A for 15 ≤ i ≤ 0 as well, i.e., (15) holds for the BOMM bytes. As for the
equality between R1 and R
′0, by the initialization procedure, R
′0 = 0. To have
R1 = 0 as well, it suﬃces to have each of the four LFSR registers s031, s
0
26, s
0
20, s
0
7
equal to C0 = S
−1(0), which is exactly the case due to the values to which
bytes K15, K8, K4 and K7 are set. Finally, to establish the equality of the LFSR
values in (15), the expression deﬁning A are substituted into the way the LFSR
is updated during the initialization procedure with the feed-forward, verifying
that s131 = s
′0
31 = K15 ⊕A. As for the other LFSR values, s1i = s
′0
i holds directly
due to the speciﬁcation of K, IV,K ′, IV ′.
Thus, the initialization procedures of the two cipher instances are slided, i.e.,
ISt = IS
′t−1 for 1 ≤ t ≤ 64. At time t = 64, in the (K, IV ) instance of
the cipher, a regular keystream step is applied, whereas in the (K ′, IV ′) in-
stance, an initialization step is applied which destroys the slide property by
introducing a diﬀerence between s6531 and s
′64
31 . However, it can be veriﬁed that
this diﬀerence does not aﬀect the two corresponding ﬁrst keystream words, which
proves (13). 
It should be noted that, as we veriﬁed by solving B ⊕C1 ⊕ S2(B ⊕C1) = A for
each A ∈ F 82 , there always exists a byte B speciﬁed by this observation.
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C Distinguisher Performance for Diﬀerent (n,m)
The following table shows the numerical values for false positive and false neg-
ative probabilities for the distinguisher presented in section 3.2.
Table 1. Eﬀectiveness of the distinguisher for diﬀerent (n,m) parameters
(n,m) P[false positive] ≈ P[false negative] ≈
(16, 6) 2−35.1 2−22.41
(16, 8) 2−50.4 2−16.00
(24, 8) 2−44.6 2−24.01
(24, 10) 2−59.2 2−19.91
(32, 10) 2−54.2 2−27.6
(32, 12) 2−68.3 2−20.68
